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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

:

KERRY B. BAKER,

Appeal No.

920550-CA

:
Category

Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this case pursuant to UCA
Annotated 78-2-2(3)(i) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated 7 6-6-410, Theft by Gross Deviation of a
Rental Agreement.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Defendant's plea was entered in this case

knowingly and voluntarily by the Defendant.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Second Judicial District Court's
acceptance of Defendant's guilty plea entered to the

offense

of

Third Degree Felony Theft, UCA Section 76-6-410 on the 8th day of
July, 1992.
Kerry Baker was arraigned in the Second Circuit Court of Weber
County on the 18th day of June, 1992 for the offenses of Theft by
Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Third Degree Felony, Theft

by Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Class A Misdemeanor,
and Theft by Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Class B
Misdemeanor.
At the Arraignment the Defendant was interviewed by the Public
Defender's Office and found to qualify for their services.

A

Preliminary Hearing was scheduled for the 26th day of June, 1992.
At the Preliminary Hearing the defense counsel and Defendant
had an opportunity to review the evidence that would be presented
by the State, including interviewing the witnesses present for that
hearing.

At that time the Defendant determined to waive the

Preliminary Hearing and a negotiation was made with the State of
Utah that the Defendant would enter a plea of guilty to the Third
Degree Felony and the other two (2) cases would be dismissed.
On the 8th day of July, 1992 the Defendant appeared in the
Second Judicial District Court before the Honorable Judge Parley
Baldwin and at that time was again arraigned on the charge of Theft
by Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Third Degree Felony.
The Court was advised that the Defendant would be entering a
guilty plea and the Court reviewed in detail the Defendant's rights
and indicated that a plea entered at that time would waive those
rights.
The Defendant also reviewed a Statement by Defendant in
Advance of a Plea read to him by Attorney Martin Gravis and
Defendant signed the same indicating that he had it read to him and
understood its contents.
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A plea of guilty was entered and sentencing was set for the
29th day of July, 1992.

At the time of sentencing the Defendant

was sentenced to serve a term in the Utah State Prison from 0-5
years and to pay restitution in the amount of $641.14 for the
offenses.
This

is an appeal of Defendant's conviction

and prison

sentence and is based upon Defendant's allegations that he entered
the plea under a promise from defense counsel, Bernard L. Allen,
that he would not go to Prison and would only serve jail time with
work release.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 4th day of December, 1990 the Defendant entered into an
agreement with Action Rental whereupon the Defendant agreed to rent
a tv, bed and headboard and chest for the respective monthly rental
fees of $50.06, $43.39 and $11.13 per month.
At that time the Defendant signed Rental Agreements on each of
the three (3) items agreeing to make said payments and further
agreed by initially the block that he would not dispose of the
property through sale or through pawning the items rented.
The Defendant further contracted that he would allow the
property removed from the location known by Action Rental.

(See

copies of Rental Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made
a part hereof by reference.)
According to the proprietor of the Action Rental store wherein
this Contract was entered, Mr. Baker was sporadic in making the
agreed upon rental payments and that finally some time after May of
3

1991 the representative of Action Rental appeared for the purpose
of recovering the items rented.
Action Rental was able to recover other items that were rented
on the same day, but the tv, bed and headboard and chest were not
to be seen. According to the agent of Action Rental, Geoff Scott,
Mr. Baker indicated to him that the property had been sold and was
no longer available to Action Rental.
Apparently further efforts were made by Action Rental to
recover the money for these items of property, however, these
efforts were unsuccessful and Informations were filed against the
Defendant as indicated above on approximately October 22, 1991.
The Defendant was taken into custody on or about the 16th day
of June, 1992 whereupon he was appointed counsel due to his
indigence and Preliminary Hearing was scheduled for the 2 6th day of
June, 1992.
At

the

Preliminary

Hearing

Attorney

Bernard

L.

Allen

represented the Defendant and had an opportunity to review with the
Defendant the statements made by witnesses in the police reports
and to discuss with the witnesses their affirmation of those
statements.

Defense

counsel

and

Defendant

were

aware

of

Defendant's previous criminal record which included a prior prison
conviction and the fact that the Defendant was currently on parole
out of the State of Washington, although counsel had been notified
that the State of Washington was no longer interested in having Mr.
Baker return to their jurisdiction.
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Arrangements for the entry of a guilty plea to the Third
Degree Felony were made and the hearing was set for Arraignment in
the District Court on the 8th day of July, 1992.

Attorney Allen

prepared the appropriate Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea
to be used as the entry of plea, but because of other required
Court appearances was not present at the Arraignment of the
Defendant.
Mr. Baker was represented by Attorney Martin Gravis, who
pursuant to the notes prepared by Attorney Allen, proceeded to
review with the Defendant all his rights pursuant to a Statement by
Defendant in Advance of Plea, which explains to Defendant all
constitutional rights, including under Paragraph 10 "no agreements
have been reached, nor representations have been made to me as to
what the sentence will be" and under Paragraph 11 which refers to
the possible maximum sentence imposed upon a guilty plea, which in
this case was 0-5 years in prison.
In a second portion of the Agreement, the Defendant agrees
under Paragraph 2 that "no threats or promises of any sort have
been made to me to induce me or to dissuade me to enter this plea"
and under Paragraph 3 "no one has told me that I would receive
probation or any other form of leniency because of my plea".
Prior to presenting his guilty plea to the Court Judge Baldwin
reviewed with Mr. Baker his constitutional rights, including his
review of the Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea and asked
(Tp. 4, line 8)

5

The Court: O.K., but you have gone through the Plea Agreement with
Mr. Gravis?
Mr. Baker: Yes.
The Court:

And you understand that.

Judge Baldwin reviewed with the Defendant the elements of the
offense and Mr. Baker indicated that he understood the elements
that would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Tp. 6,

line 15)
The Court also asked the Defendant regarding any outside
promises made to him by anyone.
The Court:

(Tp. 8, line 4-21)

Have any promises been made to you?

Mr. Baker: No.
The Court:

Mr. Baker?

Mr. Baker: No.
The Court: Are you doing this voluntarily without any duress from
anyone?
Mr. Baker: Yes.
The Court:

Do you understand that any agreements that may have

been represented
sentencing?

are not binding on this Court

in terms of

You understand that?

Mr. Baker: Yes.
The Court:

Are there any questions that you want to ask?

Mr. Baker: No.
The Court:

Are you in fact guilty of what you have been charged

with?
Mr. Baker: Yes.
6

The Court accepted the plea after ascertaining that the
Defendant was certain of his constitutional rights and aware that
he was waiving those rights by entering a plea and making an
attempt to ascertain that the plea was entered voluntarily and
knowingly.

The Class A and Class B Misdemeanors were also

dismissed at that time.
Defendant was referred to the Probation Department for a
Presentence Report and Sentencing was scheduled for the 29th day of
July, 1992.

At the time of sentencing on the 29th day of July,

1992, the Defendant was again represented by Attorney Martin Gravis
who was with the Defendant at the time of plea was entered.
Mr. Baker, through Attorney Gravis, first stated his intention
to wait for Attorney Allen to be present for sentencing, however,
in open Court Mr. Baker indicated that it was acceptable to him to
have Mr. Gravis handle the sentencing hearing.

(Tp. 11, line 12)

The Presentence Report was not favorable due to Mr. Baker's
prior criminal record, which included a term in Prison and the fact
that Defendant had on numerous occasions, violated his probation
agreements in the past.

(Tp. 12, line 7, 24, Tp. 13, line 3)

At the time set for sentencing, Mr. Baker, for the first time
brought up the assertion that his attorney had promised that he
would not serve prison time as a result of his guilty plea.
Mr. Baker:

"Well, Bernie Allen promised me one thing, he told me

I ain't going to Prison.

That he would try to get me a work

release and do some jail time. If I do

7

well, go to Prison, or a

lot of jail time, I ain't payin1 no restitution, you know.

I did

time for it."
Defendant was in fact sentenced to a term in the Utah State
Prison not to exceed

five

(5) years and was ordered to pay

restitution in the amount of $641.14.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FULLY COMPLYING
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 AND BY
FAILING TO ASCERTAIN A FACTUAL BASIS FOR SAID
PLEA OF GUILTY.
The Trial Court's pre-plea inquiry did not comply with the
requirements of Rule 11(5)(g) as the Defendant was not advised of
the thirty

(30) day limitation for his filing of a Motion to

Withdraw the Plea.

The Court also failed to extract from the

Defendant or his counsel the factual basis for the entry of said
guilty plea.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS MADE UNDER IMPROPER
INDUCEMENT FROM COUNSEL AND WAS THEREFORE NOT
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
The Defendant's plea to the charge in the present case was not
knowingly or voluntarily made due to the Defendant's assertion that
he had been promised by defense counsel that his sentence to the
charge would not include Prison, but only some jail time with
potential work release.

Such a guarantee, if made, would

constitute undue influence or improper inducement and effectively
remove the voluntary and knowing entry of Defendant's plea. Thus,
the

Defendant's

Fifth

Amendment
8

protection

against

self

incrimination and due process protection afforded by the U.S.
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 7 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution have been violated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The United States Constitution under the Fifth Amendment and
as applied to the various states by the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "No person. . .shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived,of liberty
without due process of law. . .".
The Utah Constitution under Article I, Section 5 also provides
a

criminal

Defendant with due process protection

deprivation of liberty can be imposed.

before any

Further, in Section 12,

"Rights of Accused Person" include not being "compelled to give
evidence against himself".
The Defendant, Kerry Baker, entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of Theft, a 3rd Degree Felony.

The proclamation of guilt

was clearly an act of self-incrimination and as such his statement
was an act protected by both the State and Federal Constitution as
indicated above.

It is therefore incumbent upon the Court in

accepting such a guilty plea to clearly ascertain whether the
incriminating plea in entered knowingly and voluntarily.
State v. Gardner, 230 P2d 559, (Utah) State v. Crank, 142 P2d 178,
(Utah) and State v. Breckenridge, 688 P2d 440 (Utah).
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures outline the
minimum requirements that the Court must follow in accepting a
9

guilty plea.

The case of State v. Smith, 812 P2d 470 (Utah) has

held that
"A Trial Courtfs failure to comply strictly
with this Rule in accepting a guilty or no
contest plea is good cause as a matter of law
for the withdrawal of that plea".
In the instant case, the Court did not strictly comply with
Section 5(g) of Rule 11 as Judge Baldwin failed to advise the
Defendant of his thirty (30) day limitation for filing a Motion to
Withdraw the Plea. Although this limitation was made a part of the
"Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea", this has been held to
be insufficient compliance with Rule 11(5).
State v. Gibbons, 740 P2d 1309 (Utah) and the case of
State v. Valencia, 776 P2d 1332 (Utah) which emphatically declares
that
"Strict, and not substantial, compliance with
Subsection (5) is required".
The Court's failure to so inform the Defendant may have been
the reason for the Defendant's failure to request a withdrawal of
plea in this case.
The Court also failed to require that a factual basis be
established in open Court to substantiate the appropriate and
voluntary nature of Defendant's plea.

The Smith case further

requires that:
"In addition to providing a synopsis of the
acts constituting the offense, a Trial Court,
before accepting a guilty or no contest plea,
should conduct a limited inquiry into the
evidence proving those acts. However, that
inquiry need go no further than is necessary
to assure, as a matter of due process, that
the
plea
represents
a
voluntary
and
10

intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the Defendant.
In the present case the record is devoid of any inquiry into
the evidence and therefore, no factual basis for the plea is ever
supplied. Without this inquiry according to the language in Smith,
the Court can't assure that the plea is a voluntary and intelligent
choice and further violates Defendant's due process protection.
(See also State v. Macruire, 184 UAR 39 (1992) .
POINT II
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Thorup, 2 00 UAR 67
(1992), although holding that the Defendant's plea was voluntary
and knowingly and upholding the Trial Court's denial of Defendant's
Motion to Withdraw his Plea also pointed out that
"The Trial Court's compliance with Rule 11
does not foreclosure the possibility the Court
abused its discretion in refusing Defendant's
Motion is his plea was in fact voluntary."
In the Thorup case the Defendant had moved to set aside his
guilty pleas claiming that his plea was entered under undue
influence from his father and economic coercion from his attorney.
The Trial Court's ruling emphasized that the Defendant was a
"middle aged college graduate with considerable exposure to the
criminal procedures".

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Trial

Court that with this type of Defendant the examination of the
Defendant by the Court prior to accepting the plea was fully
adequate and did not warrant withdrawing the plea.
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In the present case, however, the Defendant is not well
educated and according to counsel's statements at plea, "He doesn't
read very well." (Tp. 4 L. 7)

As implied by the Court in

the intelligence and capacity of the Defendant

is an issue

requiring that the pre-plea examination be particularly thorough
and understandable.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Forsythe, 560 P2d 337
(Utah), as quoted in Thorup stated,
"We are in full agreement with the proposition
that for a plea of guilty to be valid, it must
appear that the accused
had
a clear
understanding of the charge and without undue
influence, coercion, or improper inducement
voluntarily entered such a plea." (Id @ 338339 emphasis added)
The Defendant stated at the time of sentencing that his
attorney had promised him that he would not go to prison, but only
jail with work

release.

Although

the

Defendant

was

silent

regarding this at the time of plea and in fact stated to the
contrary that no additional promises or inducements had been made,
the Court would have to consider that if these assertions were
believed that the Defendant was improperly induced into entering
the plea of guilty in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not fully comply with the pre-plea inquiry
requirements of Rule 11 and therefore failed to ensure that the
Defendant's

plea

was

voluntarily

and

knowingly

entered

and

Defendant's assertion that he was improperly induced into entering
this plea are a violation of Defendant's rights against self
12

incrimination and guarantee of due process as provided by both the
Utah and United States Constitution.

The Defendant's conviction

should be overturned and the case remanded for Trial or further
proceedings.
/ 7

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day

SRNARD L. ALLEN
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief to counsel for
the Plaintiff, Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid this //
1993

5£4
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day of January,

"APPENDIX"

STATE OF UTAH VS. KERRY B. BAKER
Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Case No. 921900334

PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
OF WEBER COUNTY
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY

:

KERRY B. BAKER,
Defendant.

:

Case No.
Judge DAVID E. ROTH

:

I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
the following facts and rights by my attorney, that I understand
said facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of
counsel in reviewing, explaining and completing this form:
1.

The nature of the charges against me have been explained.

I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charges with
my attorney, and I understand the charges and the elements of each
charge which the government is required to prove.
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STATE OF UTAH vs. KERRY B. BAKER
Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Case No. 921900334

2.

As explained, I am charged with crimes in Weber County as

follows:
Class or
Degree

Statutory Penalty

Theft by Rental Agreement

3rd-Degree
Felony

0-5 years U.S.P. &/or
$5,000.00 fine.

Theft

Class "A"
Misdemeanor

up to one year jail
$2,500.00 fine.

Theft

Class "B"
Misdemeanor

0-6 months jail &/ or
$1,000.00 fine.

Crime

3.

The possibility

of entering a plea of guilty to the

charges has been discussed with the prosecutor as follows:
Crime
Theft by Rental Agreement

4.

Class or
Degree

Statutory Penalty

3rd-degree
Felony

0-5 years U.S.P. &/or
$5,000.00 fine.

I understand that the elements of the offenses I am

pleading guilty to are: That I exercised unauthorized control over
the property of another by grossly deviating from the agreed upon
terms of my rental agreement which resulted in the owners being
deprived of said property.
5.

I know that I can be represented by an attorney at every

stage of the proceeding, and I know that if I cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed to represent me.
6.

I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty," and I

know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea.
17

STATE OF UTAH vs. KERRY B. BAKER
Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Case No. 921900334

7.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that

if I were to stand trial by a jury:
a.
I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every
stage of the proceeding.
b.
I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who
testify against me.
c.
My attorney can cross-examine all witnesses who
testify against me.
d.
I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can
obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of
those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness and
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them.
e.
I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do
not have to testify at any trial.
f.
If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told
that no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure
to testify.
g.
The government must prove each and every element of
the offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt.
h.

A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict

me.
i.
If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I
cannot afford the cost of such an appeal, the government will
pay the costs of the appeal including the services of
appointed counsel.
8.

Under a plea of guilty, there will not be a trial of any

kind, and I am waiving my rights listed in the previous paragraph
and admitting that I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of
guilty is entered.
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STATE OF UTAH vs. KERRY B. BAKER
Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Case No. 921900334

9.

There is no appellate review of any lawful sentence

imposed under a plea of guilty.
10.

No agreements have been reached and no representations

have been made to me as to what the sentence will be.
11.

I know that under the laws of Utah, the possible maximum

sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the
charge identified on page two of this agreement, are set out in
paragraph three above.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know that under a plea of guilty, the judge may ask me

questions about the offense to which the plea is entered.
13.

The only plea agreement which has been entered into with

the government is: Upon my plea of guilty to Theft a 3rd-Degree
Felony the State agrees to dismiss the Theft "A" and Theft "B11 both
Misdemeanors.
14.

I have a right to ask the Court any questions I wish to

ask concerning my rights, or about these proceedings and the plea.
*

*

*

I make the following representations to the Court:
1.

I am 3 3 years of age. My education consists of Sepecial

Education years.

I cannot read and understand English.
19
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Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Case No. 921900334

2.

No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me

to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea.
3.

No one has told me that I would receive probation or any

other form of leniency because of my plea.
4.

I understand that I may request to withdraw a plea of

guilty within 30 days of entry of the plea, but if said request is
not made within 3 0 days I forfeit this right.

A motion to

withdraw a plea of guilty will only be granted upon good cause and
is within the discretion of the Court.
5.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyer

as much as I wish to.
6.

I am satisfied with my lawyer.

7.

My decision to enter this plea was made after full and

careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case
and the consequences of the plea.

I was not under the influence of

any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the
plea was made and I am not now under the influence of any drugs,
medication or intoxicants.
8.

I have no mental reservations concerning the plea.

DATED this

S

day of July, 1992.
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I certify that I have discussed this statement with the
Defendant; that I have fully explained his rights and believe that
he is knowingly and voluntarily

entering the plea with full

knowledge of his legal rights and that there is a factual basis for
the plea.
DATED this ^

day of July, 1992.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
I certify that I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant
in Advance of Plea of Guilty and that said statement correctly
reflects the plea negotiations of the parties.
DATED this

%

day of July, 1992.

DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
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Case No. 921900334

O R D E R
The

signature

of

the

Defendant

was

acknowledged

in

the

presence of the undersigned Judge.
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement by
Defendant

in Advance

of Plea

of Guilty,

the

court

finds

the

Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is
ordered that Defendant's plea of "guilty" to the charge(s) set
forth in the agreement be accepted and entered.
DONE in Court this

day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT CaURTCogOUETpBER
WEBER G0077T7
State of Utah, -_.^
)
vs.
*
\ q o ||]i q i c'm I 1 C
J
BAKER, KERRY B
"
."jl,* f5
Defendant.
j
--00O00--

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
'
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE
PRIS0N

" " N ° : 92190Q3J4

JUL 3 l J99^

Defendant having been convicted by [ l a jury; [ 1 the court; iiplea of guilty;
[]plea of no contest';* of 'the 'offense of "THEFT BY RENTAL AGREEMENT
a
felony of the 3rd degree, being now present iX court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
initials
i'V /S £ ]
[]
[]
[]

THE BASIC SENTENCE
not to exceed five. (5) years, at ..the Utah State Prison;
not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
to pay fine in the amount of $
.
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
[ ] one (1) year at Utah'State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1) J (2) or (3);
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3)
[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison.

RESTITUTION
(X] Defendant is ordered to pay .restitution m the amount of $641,14
ACTION T V
~
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Defendant is remanded into custody of:
j*] the Sheriff o f . t h i s county,.for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
[ ] the Warden for execution of this sentence.
DATED this

29th

day of
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PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
INC., OF WEBER COUNTY
BERNARD L. ALLEN (#0039)
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

AUG 2 1 1992

:

KERRY B. BAKER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 921900334
JUDGE Oqv^O (foth

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
NOTICE

IS

HEREBY

GIVEN

that

KERRY

B.

BAKER,

Defendant/Appellant, hereby appeals from the judgment rendered in
this action, wherein the Defendant/Appellant was convicted of Theft
a 3rd-Degree Felony on July 29, 1992.
DATED this .-~>y day of August, 1992.

BERNARD L. ALLEN
Attorney-, for Defendant/Appellant

BERNARD L. ALLEN (#0039)
Attorney for Defendant
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STIPULATION FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT'S
BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 920550-CA

vs.
KERRY B. BAKER,
Defendant and Appellant.

COMES NOW, Bernard L. Allen, Attorney for Defendant and hereby
moves that pursuant to Rule 26(a), of the Utah Rules of Appellant
Procedure (1985) , and due to the fact that the Attorney Bernard L.
Allen is in need of an additional thirty (30) days to complete
Defendant's

brief. That

the

Defendant/Appellant

may

have an

enlargement of tiem in which to file Appellant's Brief from
November 23, 1992, until December 23, 1992.

BERNARD Lr^LLEJJ
Attorney for Appellant
The State stipulates—tafet—tho appollatn—may—hw*
qn—*
-enlargement of time in which to file his brief;-"— Joes IAO^ o!0]&dt'

^o offdkvNrs

v£r>jL/e^>i •£*/- OAS^ e^ij{\r^v^ju^i~
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fqftsaH flreJan
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

3

DEC 41992
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

cnan
Osurt

State of Ut|ah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

Case No. 920550-CA

v.
Kerry B. Baker,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion
for extension of time to file the appellant's brief, filed
November 30, 1992.

Appellee does not object to the motion.

Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is
granted an extension of time to December 23, 1992, to file
appellant's brief.
Dated this

^ ^ d a y of November, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

N o r m a n H. Jac£&&on,

Judge

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due proc*
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infair
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in c,
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual servic
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the s
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, libt
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be take:
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a sp
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district whereir
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previc
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac<
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compu
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistan
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed t\
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, tha
cording to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
and unusual punishments inflicted.

20

Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federa1
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 6
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law **
83(1), 121 to 123.

T

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security anc
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawfii
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla
ture from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amen*
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for th
legislature to forbid the possession of dangc
ous weapons by those who are not citizens^ c
who have been convicted of crimes, or who ai
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally mcon
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Uta
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d, — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J,S. — 16A C J S . Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity ar
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession c
carrying of knife, 47 A.L R,4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <*» 8
Weapons «» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due proce*
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid
because it delegates to industrial commission
the power to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122
(1920).
Dependents of employee killed by acts of
third party, a stranger to employment, are not

limited to recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P 9
(1927).
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. Aft). 1990)':

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248.
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266.
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275.
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 47.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 129.
Am. Jur, 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law ^ 613 to 617.
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§§ 1428 to 1437.
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state

criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
A.L.R.4th 1196.
False light invasion of privacy—defenses
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244.
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or otherwise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57
A.L.R.4th 404.
Libel or slander: defamation by statement
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520.
Defamation: designation as scab, 65
A.L.R.4th 1000.
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable,
70 A.L.R.4th 984.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law
s=> 322, 324, 327, 328.

Sec. 12- [Rights of accused persons,]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear an3
defend in person and by counsel, to dema ^ the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereci, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense il
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused ?
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not M%
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, ^ H
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Hi8tory: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants,
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.
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Rule 11

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Pleas.
(1) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant may not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to
confer with counsel.
(2) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shal1
enter a plea of not guilty.
(3) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(4) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a
jury trial.
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found:
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence that
may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under
Section 77-13-6.
(7) (a) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(b) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court.
(8) (a) The judge may not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
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1
2

THE COURT:
you—first

Thank you.

Then, Mr. Baker, I ask

of all I w a n t t o k n o w w h a t y o u r e d u c a t i o n

3

MR. BAKER:

I went to

4

THE COURT:

Do y o u u n d e r s t a n d — r e a d

5

understand the English

6

MR. BAKER:

7

MR. GRAVIS:

8

THE COURT:

is.

sophomore.
and

language?

I understand

English, yes.

He doesn't read very
Okay.

well.

But you have gone

9

the plea agreement with Mr.

10

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

And you understand

through

Gravis?

that?

You

have

12

heard your attorney make statements as to w h a t h e — h e

13

t e l l i n g m e w h a t y o u intend t o d o .

14

misleading

15

intend t o

Is t h e r e

from w h a t h e h a s t o l d m e ?

anything

Is that what

MR. BAKER:

Yes, sir.

17

THE COURT:

A r e y o u u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of

alcohol or drug at this
MR. BAKER:

N o , sir.

20

THE COURT:

A n y o t h e r k i n d of h e a l t h

that you may not be thinking too
MR. BAKER:

No.

23

THE COURT:

Are you presently

25

kind of m e d i c a l

treatment?

MR. BAKER:

No—-yeah.

condition

clearly?

22

24

any

time?

19

21

you

do?

16

18

is

receiving

any

1

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

2

THE COURT:

You understand that you would have

3

the right t o c o n f r o n t t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s and c a l l

4

witnesses t h a t y o u r a t t o r n e y s u p p l i e d , in t h e e v e n t h e

5

felt best and y o u felt b e s t , in y o u r b e h a l f .

6

understand t h a t ?

Do y o u

7

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

8

THE COURT:

Do y o u u n d e r s t a n d t h a t at t h e t i m e

9

of trial t h a t it w o u l d b e t h e o b l i g a t i o n of t h e S t a t e t o

10

p r o v e y o u r g u i l t b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t of e a c h of

11

the e l e m e n t s ?

12

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

13

THE COURT:

You u n d e r s t a n d

14

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

15 J

THE COURT:

T o b e c o n v i c t e d of a t h i r d

that?

degree

16

felony, the t h e f t , t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w o u l d h a v e t o p r o v e

17

t h a t y o u had c u s t o d y of a TV t h a t w a s t h e p r o p e r t y of

18 I A c t i o n T V R e n t a l .
19

T h a t it w a s a v a l u e of in e x c e s s of

$ 2 5 0 . 0 0 , b u t less t h a n $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 .

T h a t p u r s u a n t to t h e

20 I rental or l e a s e a g r e e m e n t t h a t it w a s n o t r e t u r n e d
21

the specified t i m e .

22

failed to c o m p l y w i t h t h e t e r m s of t h a t

A n d in so d o i n g y o u

23 | concerning t h e r e t u r n of t h a t item.

in

intentionally
agreement

You understand

that

24

each of t h o s e e l e m e n t s w o u l d h a v e t o b e p r o v e n b e y o n d a

25

reasonable d o u b t .

Do y o u u n d e r s t a n d

that?

1

there any additional talk you want to have with your

2

counsel?

3

MR. BAKER:

No.

4

THE COURT:

Have-any promises"been made to'you?

5

MR7„BAKER:

No.

6

•SHE*. COURT: Mr. Baker?

7

<W&..> BAKER: No.

8

THE COURT:

9

Are you doing this voluntarily,

without any duress from anyone?

10

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

Do> you understand that any

12
13

agreements' \ that ^may have been represented are not
..biridi'ng" bn-^ this Court in terms of sentencing, you *

14 •t&ndeiE'jStandv-that? 15

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

16

THE COURT;

Are there any questions that you

17

want to ask?

18

MR. BAKER:

No.

19

THE COURT:

Are you in fact guilty of what has

20

been—you have been charged with?

21

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

22

THE COURT:

Do you have a statement, Mr.

23

Gravis, of what the- -

24

MR. GRAVIS:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Thank you.

I have in front of me,

1

(July 29, 1992,

Sentence)

2
3

|

4

THE COURT:

The State of Utah v s . Kerry Baker

for sentencing.

5

I

6

I Baker's attorney is M r . Allen.

7

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, may we pass that?

he wants M r . Allen here.

Mr

He indicates to m e that

I left a message.

I will try

8 I to get Mr. Allen over, unless he is willing to do it
9

without M r Allen.

10

THE COURT:

11

Thank you.

Do you want to wait for

Mr. Allen?

12

MR. BAKER:

I can get it over with now.

13

THE COURT:

Have you had a chance to review it?

14

MR. GRAVIS:

I have, your Honor.

Kerry, step

15 I on down here.
16

THE COURT:

This is the time set for sentencing

17

in this matter.

18

should not be imposed?

Is there any legal reason that sentence

19

MR. GRAVIS:

20

THE COURT:

N o , your Honor.
Mr. Daines, would the State like to

21 | be heard in this matter?
22

I

23 I

MR. DAINES:
THE COURT:

N o , your Honor.
I have r e c e i v e d — r e q u e s t e d and now

24 J received a recommendation from the Department of
25

Corrections.

I think, Mr. Gravis, you have received a

1

copy of that.

2

review the matter with Mr. Baker?

Have you had a chance to review that and

3

MR. GRAVIS:

4

THE COURT:

5

Yes, your Honor, I have.
Is there anything you would like to

say now before I impose sentence?

6

MR. GRAVIS:

No, your Honor.

Of course it is

7

not a very good recommendation.

He does have a — h e has

8

been to prison before.

9

has some problems that might be addressed by a

And I think Mr. J o n e s — M r . Baker

10

diagnostic evaluation.

11

keep repeating as an offender.

12

that can be done other than sending him to prison.

13
14

THE COURT:

Otherwise, he is just going to

Thank you.

Maybe there is something

Mr. Baker, is there

anything you want to tell me?

15

MR. BAKER:

Well, Bernie Allen promised me tone

16

thing, he told me 1^ain't going to prison.

17

try to get m e a work release and do some jail time.

18

I do—well,-* go .to prison or a lot of jail time, I ain't

19

paying no restitution, you know.

20

THE COURT:

And he would
If

I did time for it.

Thank you, Mr. Baker.

This is

21

a — t h e facts in this situation are normally not those

22

that would bring about a recommendation and imposition

23

of prison.

24

history, it is filled with violations.

25

prison.

However, Mr. Baker, as I look over your past

You have been in and out.

You have been to

I think the staff of

] the Department of Corrections, that this is the kind of
2

' a case where there is nothing left to do.

3

placed in about every program there is.

4

through those programs, most of them unsuccessful.

5

You have been

You have been
You

I are in a situation now as you violate the law you are
just going to spend time.

There is no other program.

If you want to get down to the prison and attempt to
8

I P u t yourself in programs that are going to help you,

9

J your rehabilitation now, I think it is up to you.

I

don't think anybody—

10
11

MR. BAKER:

12 | Honor.

I have been there before, your

No programs in prison, no programs at all,

13

I

14

I out and say that's not correct.

THE COURT:

I think there are others that come
But no one is going to

15

force you to do that.

16

you are now in a situation where you are going to

17

prison.

18

law, you are going to go back.

19

something else are over.

20

But I am going to tell you that

When you get out of prison, if you violate the
The days of trying to do

The Court is imposing—sentencing you to spend zero

21

to five years in the Utah State Prison.

22

| ordering that you pay restitution

23

I

I am also

MR. BAKER:

I won't pay no restitution

24

THE COURT:

Thank y o u .

25

MR. BAKER:

I w o n ' t pay

Of $ 6 4 1 . 1 4 ,
it.

